Showing posts with label umcdf. Show all posts
Showing posts with label umcdf. Show all posts
Saturday, February 20, 2010
Army: Waste to be treated on site
Hermiston Herald
August 20, 2002
Army: Waste to be treated on site
By Frank Lockwood (F. Ellsworth Lockwood, now of Eltopia, Washington)
Staff writer
HERMISTON - The Department of Environmental Quality will seek permit modifications "dovetailing" with the Army's reassurances that a liquid hazardous waste, called brine, will be treated on site at the depot - not shipped to Washington or elsewhere, a DEQ spokesman says. Critics have long worried that the incineration of chemical weapons at Umatilla would create amounts of liquid waste too great or too toxic to be processed using BRA, or the Brine Reduction Area systems, and that Umatilla, like Tooele, Utah, would abandon plans for using BRA technology, in favor of shipping the material to hazardous waste sites, leaving a legacy of
contamination.
But plans to operate the Brine Reduction Area have not changed for Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, regardless of what may be done at other chemical agent disposal sites around the country, Umatilla Chemical Disposal Facility Project Manager Don Barclay said at Thursday evening's meeting of the Citizens Advisory Commission.
"Each site is an individual site with individual needs," said depot Mary Binder.
Mid-August news articles had suggested the Army might renege on its plan for handling waste water on site at Umatilla, instead trucking it off site, perhaps through Tri-Cities en route to Kent, Wash. Presently, UMCDF is temporarily sending brine to Kent, during surrogate testing, because the BRA is not yet up and running.
As early as May, environmental groups said they feared that the transportation of liquid wastes would not stop with the end of surrogate burn trials at the depot, and that the Brine Reduction Area technology would be left idle.
Joseph Keating, on behalf of the group, GASP, testified during a July 26 hearing before the Environmental Quality Commission, saying, "We agree with the Umatilla Tribes' concern about the Army plan to eliminate the Brine Reduction Area."
The Brine Reduction Area was built to process liquid wastes generated by incineration at UMCDF. The BRA reduces wastes to a salt-like substance.
According to GASP, the Army has known about BRA "problems" since testing and operations at Johnston Atoll and Tooele, Utah incinerators. If the Army did discontinue use of the the BRA, it would be the second major part of the Umatilla incinerator to be abandoned, the first being the dunnage incinerators.
Dunnage incinerators were originally planned for disposing of such things as wooden pallets, but the Army later reported a plan to modify other incinerators to handle that waste. Army spokesmen say they found better ways to treat the dunnage. Detractors claim the "DUN" was simply "inoperable."
Be that as it may, Wayne Thomas, DEQ program administrator, said Thursday that his agency will seek a permit modification to make it clear that the liquid brine waste is to be treated on site, not shipped away, and PMCD's site project manager Don Barclay said the Army had already hired the crews to operate the facility.
Confusion may have arisen because of BRA decisions at other chemical weapons disposal sites, Barclay said, but those decisions do not change the plan for UMCDF.
Concerns increased when Barclay could not "absolutely promise" that no liquid brine would ever be shipped off site at UMCDF once surrogate burns were complete and real agent incineration had begun.
Unforeseen events could eventually dictate off-site disposal, Barclay admitted, but that is neither the plan nor the intent. If the incinerators generate more waste than can be stored and treated at the depot, however, under the present permits the incinerator operators might, indeed, be able to seek another alternative. In Tooele, the Army made the decision to ship brine water off site, because using the BRA system was considered ineffective and costly.
Binder said that some wastewater has been processed at Johnston Atoll, however and that this is not new technology, a claim that critics dispute. The Umatilla facility does have double the storage capability of Johnston Atoll - four 40,000-gallon tanks to JA's two, and three BRA driers compared with JA's two.
"Based on all that we know, we believe that we will be able to" process on site all of the waste water brine that UMCDF generates, by using the BRA facility, Binder said.
http://www.cwwg.org/hh08.20.02a.html
Court compels Army to turn over documents
By Frank (F. Ellsworth) Lockwood
Published in Hermiston Herald
August 13, 2002
(Also posted at www.cwwg.org)
HERMISTON - The United States District Court has ordered the Army to turn over documents pertaining to the workers injured by mysterious fumes at Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) on Sept. 15, 1999.
No one from chemical demilitarization has been able to give a definitive answer as to what sickened workers in the building known as the MDB, causing some 30 of them to seek medical attention at nearby hospitals.
In February, the victims of the Sept. 15, 1999 incident filed what is called a "Motion to Compel." A motion to compel is a pleading which asks the court to tell someone, in this case the Army, to produce certain materials. The motion was filed because the Army refused to produce 58 requested documents, instead claiming a "deliberative process privilege." The order compelling discovery of 58 documents was signed by U.S. Court District Judge Dennis Hubel on April 3.
Past courts have refused to apply the shield when government misconduct or bad faith is at issue. The ill workers' case involves "the Army's credibility and the public's need to rely on accurate government fact finding and reporting," the plaintiffs' memorandum says. Disclosure of the documents would assist in restoring the public's faith in the management of the chemical weapons stockpiled at Umatilla, memorandum claimed.
On the other hand, if the documents prove that the contractor, Raytheon, now called Washington Demilitarization, knew that the air monitoring tests inside the Munitions Demilitarization Building detected chemical agents, then Raytheon's failure to notify, properly treat and decontaminate the injured employees could be "evidence of negligence or worse."
Workers hope the documents will reveal which defendants knew that Raytheon refused the Army Depot clinic's help, and who was responsible for that refusal. They also contend that air monitoring was conducted in the wrong rooms in the MDB, and the documents may show which, if any, defendants knew that. Also sought was information which would reveal which defendants knew why the RTAP monitoring units, stationed minutes away from the MDB, delayed for over three hours before beginning air monitoring at the site of the accident.
Depot officials, as well as depot workers privately, have told The Hermiston Herald that the Army did not treat the incident as if it were a nerve gas incident because it was impossible, they say, that nerve gas could have been involved.
The plaintiffs' memorandum claimed that, though the United States and the contractor, Raytheon, published separate investigation reports, the investigations were interrelated in a complex way.
The implication was that the reports by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the depot, the Program Manager for Chemical Stockpile Demilitarization, and Raytheon Demilitarization depended upon each others' information, instead of drawing their own conclusions independently.
"These entities were reviewing and providing editorial comments on each other's draft reports, and were complexly linked together in the incident investigation," investigators for the workers reported.
Also involved in depot safety was Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). SAIC regularly conducted safety reviews at the UMCDF construction site and reported the results to the Army, but e-mail from Loren Sharp, plant manager for Raytheon at the time, is expected to indicate that Sharp influenced SAIC investigator Leslie Hutchinson to make unspecified change his report.
Hutchinson alone, among investigators, discussed prior similar exposure incidents the week of Sept. 15, 1999 though the Army and SAIC are thought to have been "well aware" of the similar, smaller, incidents occurring around the time of the big incident.
Plaintiffs have alleged that the investigation was fraudulent. Each of the compelled 58 documents relates in some manner to the investigation of the incident. "These documents are the best evidence to prove or disprove this allegation," argued James McCandlish, attorney for the plaintiffs. McCandlish also wanted to access any personal copies of the investigators' reports, which could have handwritten notes that shed more light on the incident.
"The liability of the construction company defendants and SAIC will, in large part, be determined by what information each of them were aware of (fraud), or should have been aware of (negligence)," the plaintiffs' memorandum states, and the Army has an interest in shielding these contractors from liability, because they have indemnified Raytheon and SAIC is an agent of the Army, not an independent contractor for liability purposes.
Attorneys for the workers will try to prove that the Army hid the results from the public when gas was detected, that the Army misrepresented the results, thus clearing chemical agent as a cause, and that the Army falsely asserted the equipment was not sufficiently sensitive to rely on the admitted detections, but later spent several million dollars to stop the leaks where by agent had a clear path to the environment.
The suit also alleges the Army made false claims about wind direction during the incident. The Army records the wind speed and direction every 15 minutes at several stations located around the UMCD, but the actual records were not included in the reports, the memorandum states. The Army at first claimed the wind was blowing the wrong direction to have blown any agent in the direction of the MDB, but wind reports, later obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, indicated otherwise.
"The wind records do not exonerate chemical agent as a cause of the incident," the memorandum claims.
The Army issued a public press release at 2:30 p.m. on the day of the incident, stating that chemical agent was not the cause of the incident, although air monitoring for chemical agent inside the MDB did not begin until 3:10 p.m., and the results were not available until 3:45. (The incident had occurred about 11 a.m.)
Workers say they were assured the igloos were "air tight" and that chemicals could not escape. Later, the DEQ contended that vents and drains presented an open path to the environment, and required them to be modified.
Plaintiffs and their families say they continue to suffer the after effects of the September incident: damaged lungs, reactive airway disease, skin rashes and lethargy and more.
Meanwhile, attorneys amended the complaint for the third time, on June 17. Among other things, the amended complaint attempts to plea fraud claims with greater specificity and to reflect facts that had been learned by discovery up to that time. A fourth amended complaint is expected in the future.
The full discovery is expected to either confirm some concerns, or dispel them as "merely suspicions."
Frank Lockwood may be reached at 567-6457 or by e-mail at flockwood@hermistonherald.com
Published in Hermiston Herald
August 13, 2002
(Also posted at www.cwwg.org)
HERMISTON - The United States District Court has ordered the Army to turn over documents pertaining to the workers injured by mysterious fumes at Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) on Sept. 15, 1999.
No one from chemical demilitarization has been able to give a definitive answer as to what sickened workers in the building known as the MDB, causing some 30 of them to seek medical attention at nearby hospitals.
In February, the victims of the Sept. 15, 1999 incident filed what is called a "Motion to Compel." A motion to compel is a pleading which asks the court to tell someone, in this case the Army, to produce certain materials. The motion was filed because the Army refused to produce 58 requested documents, instead claiming a "deliberative process privilege." The order compelling discovery of 58 documents was signed by U.S. Court District Judge Dennis Hubel on April 3.
Past courts have refused to apply the shield when government misconduct or bad faith is at issue. The ill workers' case involves "the Army's credibility and the public's need to rely on accurate government fact finding and reporting," the plaintiffs' memorandum says. Disclosure of the documents would assist in restoring the public's faith in the management of the chemical weapons stockpiled at Umatilla, memorandum claimed.
On the other hand, if the documents prove that the contractor, Raytheon, now called Washington Demilitarization, knew that the air monitoring tests inside the Munitions Demilitarization Building detected chemical agents, then Raytheon's failure to notify, properly treat and decontaminate the injured employees could be "evidence of negligence or worse."
Workers hope the documents will reveal which defendants knew that Raytheon refused the Army Depot clinic's help, and who was responsible for that refusal. They also contend that air monitoring was conducted in the wrong rooms in the MDB, and the documents may show which, if any, defendants knew that. Also sought was information which would reveal which defendants knew why the RTAP monitoring units, stationed minutes away from the MDB, delayed for over three hours before beginning air monitoring at the site of the accident.
Depot officials, as well as depot workers privately, have told The Hermiston Herald that the Army did not treat the incident as if it were a nerve gas incident because it was impossible, they say, that nerve gas could have been involved.
The plaintiffs' memorandum claimed that, though the United States and the contractor, Raytheon, published separate investigation reports, the investigations were interrelated in a complex way.
The implication was that the reports by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the depot, the Program Manager for Chemical Stockpile Demilitarization, and Raytheon Demilitarization depended upon each others' information, instead of drawing their own conclusions independently.
"These entities were reviewing and providing editorial comments on each other's draft reports, and were complexly linked together in the incident investigation," investigators for the workers reported.
Also involved in depot safety was Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). SAIC regularly conducted safety reviews at the UMCDF construction site and reported the results to the Army, but e-mail from Loren Sharp, plant manager for Raytheon at the time, is expected to indicate that Sharp influenced SAIC investigator Leslie Hutchinson to make unspecified change his report.
Hutchinson alone, among investigators, discussed prior similar exposure incidents the week of Sept. 15, 1999 though the Army and SAIC are thought to have been "well aware" of the similar, smaller, incidents occurring around the time of the big incident.
Plaintiffs have alleged that the investigation was fraudulent. Each of the compelled 58 documents relates in some manner to the investigation of the incident. "These documents are the best evidence to prove or disprove this allegation," argued James McCandlish, attorney for the plaintiffs. McCandlish also wanted to access any personal copies of the investigators' reports, which could have handwritten notes that shed more light on the incident.
"The liability of the construction company defendants and SAIC will, in large part, be determined by what information each of them were aware of (fraud), or should have been aware of (negligence)," the plaintiffs' memorandum states, and the Army has an interest in shielding these contractors from liability, because they have indemnified Raytheon and SAIC is an agent of the Army, not an independent contractor for liability purposes.
Attorneys for the workers will try to prove that the Army hid the results from the public when gas was detected, that the Army misrepresented the results, thus clearing chemical agent as a cause, and that the Army falsely asserted the equipment was not sufficiently sensitive to rely on the admitted detections, but later spent several million dollars to stop the leaks where by agent had a clear path to the environment.
The suit also alleges the Army made false claims about wind direction during the incident. The Army records the wind speed and direction every 15 minutes at several stations located around the UMCD, but the actual records were not included in the reports, the memorandum states. The Army at first claimed the wind was blowing the wrong direction to have blown any agent in the direction of the MDB, but wind reports, later obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, indicated otherwise.
"The wind records do not exonerate chemical agent as a cause of the incident," the memorandum claims.
The Army issued a public press release at 2:30 p.m. on the day of the incident, stating that chemical agent was not the cause of the incident, although air monitoring for chemical agent inside the MDB did not begin until 3:10 p.m., and the results were not available until 3:45. (The incident had occurred about 11 a.m.)
Workers say they were assured the igloos were "air tight" and that chemicals could not escape. Later, the DEQ contended that vents and drains presented an open path to the environment, and required them to be modified.
Plaintiffs and their families say they continue to suffer the after effects of the September incident: damaged lungs, reactive airway disease, skin rashes and lethargy and more.
Meanwhile, attorneys amended the complaint for the third time, on June 17. Among other things, the amended complaint attempts to plea fraud claims with greater specificity and to reflect facts that had been learned by discovery up to that time. A fourth amended complaint is expected in the future.
The full discovery is expected to either confirm some concerns, or dispel them as "merely suspicions."
Frank Lockwood may be reached at 567-6457 or by e-mail at flockwood@hermistonherald.com
Friday, January 29, 2010
2001: Strict control of news from chemical depot ...
Hermiston Herald - - Dec 4, 2001
Strict control of news from chemical depot nothing new
By Frank Lockwood
Because of official policy, for the most part the public knows only what the Army and it's contractors want known about chemical demilitarization at Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF).
If past news stories about Umatilla Chemical Depot seemed as if they were written by the Army and the Army's contractors, that is because, largely, they probably were. And that may account for the scarcity of personal interviews and genuine on-the-scene reporting.
There has seen a news clampdown since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the East Coast, but information stemming from the depot's demilitarization program had been controlled long before then.
Before Sept. 11, the depot issued frequent press releases regarding activities and events at the depot. Since then, the approach has changed to a policy of "If not asked, do not tell." Public information officers still answer some questions, if asked specific questions, but no longer volunteer information.
But the news from the depot was filtered long before Sept. 11. Construction workers, in order to be hired, were required, first by Raytheon and later by Washington Demilitarization, to sign "no singing" contracts which prevented them from speaking with the media without prior approval from media experts.
Raytheon's document, titled UM-POL-006, effective Sept. 9, 1999, described the conditions and methods by which Raytheon employees could release Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility project information to the general public. The policy also applied to all Raytheon subcontractors.
The protocol officer was required to review and pre-approve all Raytheon and Raytheon subcontractor-generated materials intended for public use. The protocol officer also was to ensure accurate notification and coordination of public information with the Department of the Army before public release.
Information for public release included, but was not limited to, information for public meetings, response to questions regardless of source or method received, and any presentation materials produced for a public audience. In other words, information the media and the public is allowed to have is limited to that which both the contractors and the Army want them to have."The Protocol Officer will pre-approve all final statements provided to the general public," the document states.
Furthermore, Raytheon employees were not to speak their minds in public meetings, and were to give advance notice of their involvement. "Raytheon employees planning participation in public meetings will contact the Protocol Officer at least three working days in advance of a public presentation and provide the Protocol Officer with presentation materials." A similar policy was described in Washington Demilitarization's UM-POL-001. "It is (Washington Demilitarization's) policy not to release information to the media, except through the Protocol Officer, or ... Project Manager," the policy says.
Furthermore, the contractor does not welcome surprise visits by the media. Employees were ordered not to speak, even if spoken to by the media.The following instructions were included in the employee training and
contracts:
In addition, the company wanted to coordinate (with the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization Office's Public Affairs Officer) in advance all information to be released .
While people in the community have been interviewed, their opinions were likely formed through information that had been laundered.
First-hand accounts of day by day activities at Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility were, and will likely continue to be, rare.
According to a local union official, workers have too much to lose by speaking their minds, regardless of what they might want to say
Strict control of news from chemical depot nothing new
By Frank Lockwood
Because of official policy, for the most part the public knows only what the Army and it's contractors want known about chemical demilitarization at Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF).
If past news stories about Umatilla Chemical Depot seemed as if they were written by the Army and the Army's contractors, that is because, largely, they probably were. And that may account for the scarcity of personal interviews and genuine on-the-scene reporting.
There has seen a news clampdown since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the East Coast, but information stemming from the depot's demilitarization program had been controlled long before then.
Before Sept. 11, the depot issued frequent press releases regarding activities and events at the depot. Since then, the approach has changed to a policy of "If not asked, do not tell." Public information officers still answer some questions, if asked specific questions, but no longer volunteer information.
But the news from the depot was filtered long before Sept. 11. Construction workers, in order to be hired, were required, first by Raytheon and later by Washington Demilitarization, to sign "no singing" contracts which prevented them from speaking with the media without prior approval from media experts.
Raytheon's document, titled UM-POL-006, effective Sept. 9, 1999, described the conditions and methods by which Raytheon employees could release Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility project information to the general public. The policy also applied to all Raytheon subcontractors.
The protocol officer was required to review and pre-approve all Raytheon and Raytheon subcontractor-generated materials intended for public use. The protocol officer also was to ensure accurate notification and coordination of public information with the Department of the Army before public release.
Information for public release included, but was not limited to, information for public meetings, response to questions regardless of source or method received, and any presentation materials produced for a public audience. In other words, information the media and the public is allowed to have is limited to that which both the contractors and the Army want them to have."The Protocol Officer will pre-approve all final statements provided to the general public," the document states.
Furthermore, Raytheon employees were not to speak their minds in public meetings, and were to give advance notice of their involvement. "Raytheon employees planning participation in public meetings will contact the Protocol Officer at least three working days in advance of a public presentation and provide the Protocol Officer with presentation materials." A similar policy was described in Washington Demilitarization's UM-POL-001. "It is (Washington Demilitarization's) policy not to release information to the media, except through the Protocol Officer, or ... Project Manager," the policy says.
Furthermore, the contractor does not welcome surprise visits by the media. Employees were ordered not to speak, even if spoken to by the media.The following instructions were included in the employee training and
contracts:
- Do not give interviews or release information unless directed by the
- Protocol Officer.
- Direct all media inquiries to the Protocol Officer.
- Contact Umatilla Chemical Depot Security and the Protocol Officer immediately if the media arrives unannounced at the UMCDF site.
In addition, the company wanted to coordinate (with the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization Office's Public Affairs Officer) in advance all information to be released .
While people in the community have been interviewed, their opinions were likely formed through information that had been laundered.
First-hand accounts of day by day activities at Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility were, and will likely continue to be, rare.
According to a local union official, workers have too much to lose by speaking their minds, regardless of what they might want to say
2002: Army Concludes Analysis of risk assessment
Hermiston Herald
August 20, 2002
Army concludes analysis of risk assessment
By Frank Lockwood
Staff writer
HERMISTON - The Army has finished a defense of the UMCDF Quantitative Risk Assessment Phase 1. Meanwhile, local emergency managers say they have yet to receive a copy of QRA Phase 2, which the Army says is secret.
The review was done at the request of the state in response to comments by Texas risk analyst Jared Black who had done an unfunded review of the document. It is hard to tell who is right in the matter, but emergency managers say the result is extra safety for residents and the environment. Black had first argued there were weaknesses in the Phase 1 study, when he wrote that:
The Army had hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to review some of Black's remarks. Black's initial assessment had reinforced the view that continued storage of the chemical agent presents the greatest risk to the community. Bunch wrote, "I wish to express my thanks to R.Black," and, "The public will gain a better understanding of the risk assessment process and the need to destroy these weapons as soon as possible."
Beneath the diplomatic language lurked basic differences in approach and a lack of communication between the major players. Black, in a July 30 e-mail correspondence with the Hermiston Herald, said SAIC had not consulted with him, and that neither the new nor the old toxicity standards were reliable.
"I've not been contacted by anyone other than (the activists) Craig Williams and Karyn Jones, and that was some time ago," he wrote. "I've reviewed the EPA AEGL reports on VX and the G series nerve agents and find them surprisingly weak."
Following Black's initial review of the Phase 1 QRA, Black investigated further, and ended up with more concerns, this time regarding the Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) proposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The new guidelines are eventually expected to provide a common standard for organizations responding to chemical accidents. A technical review group, which includes Oregon and Washington officials, is now reviewing AEGL information.
SAIC's technical response puts off arguments about the AEGLs for later, on the one hand, and defends QRA Phase 1 on the other, citing alleged flaws in Black's study. "It is not possible to determine if Dr. Black's source data or analysis were completed with the same depth and rigor as that used in the UMCDF (Army documents)," the response states. SAIC further criticized some of Black's methods as "simplistic" and "without the degree of rigor" that the Army had used.
Seismic Events: Much of the SAIC report is technical, with terminology such as "ground motion attenuation relationships," and it includes complex mathematical formulas that are given to demonstrate that the Army was right, Black wrong, about seismic events. Other parts of the report seem clear enough for the lay reader: "What is critical is that the public understands that a severe earthquake, though very rare, could strike tomorrow."
Processing Risks risks not explicit in the report were assumed to be the same as those in Tooele, SAIC says. And for many "initiating events" there is no escape of agent to the environment. "Fault trees" are in the appendix. Agent type, release quantity, release duration, release type [spill, explosion, fire, etc.] and relevant consequence estimates for each sequence are include in the3 draft Phase 2 QRA.
Black was traveling at the time the SAIC report came out, but said he will look at the SAIC documents after he returns from his trip, which will be in September. An August 5 letter from Black to William Sanders, US EPA's Office Director, however, indicate Black's position at that time. He wrote, "The people living near the facility are concerned about the safety of the disposal process. ... Their concern is not misplaced."
While the Army's allowable toxicity levels, based on healthy male soldiers, were too high for the general public, Black says that the EPA's figures are biased in the other direction.
"I find the Public Draft reports provide very weak scientific support for the proposed AEGLs; the recommended thresholds are strongly, even unreasonably, biased toward low exposure levels. The result is that the exposure levels used in the Army's Phase 1 QRA are placed in question by equally questionable EPA results, leaving the public with no reliable way to assess their own safety."
And SAIC's analysis said, "Black takes the simplistic approach that any even involving a certain number of munitions results in an immediate and total release of the agent contents of those munitions."
Whether that is true, and regardless who is right, emergency managers say they are glad that, when in doubt, the EPA set lower exposure levels. In cases where there was uncertainty, the EPA simply built in a greater factor of safety, and that means more protection for the public, they say.
Morrow County Emergency Manager Casey Beard, however, told the Hermiston Herald earlier this month that he had yet to see a copy of Army's updated risk analysis, or QRA Phase 2, and that he needs that documentation in order to ensure the safety of the community. Beard said he can qualify for any level of security which the Army might require, but, "I need to see a copy of that information."
End
--------------------------
Appreciation: Article was preserved by iRazoo (http://www.irazoo.com/ViewSite.aspx?q=Hermiston+Herald&Page=1&irp=1&Site=http://www.cwwg.org/hh08.20.02b.html
Thank you iRazoo.
August 20, 2002
Army concludes analysis of risk assessment
By Frank Lockwood
Staff writer
HERMISTON - The Army has finished a defense of the UMCDF Quantitative Risk Assessment Phase 1. Meanwhile, local emergency managers say they have yet to receive a copy of QRA Phase 2, which the Army says is secret.
The review was done at the request of the state in response to comments by Texas risk analyst Jared Black who had done an unfunded review of the document. It is hard to tell who is right in the matter, but emergency managers say the result is extra safety for residents and the environment. Black had first argued there were weaknesses in the Phase 1 study, when he wrote that:
- The Army's seismic (earthquake) risk is overstated
- The fault tree analysis gives no details on the processing risks
- No information is given on the relationship between the quantity of
- chemical agent release and public health risk.
The Army had hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to review some of Black's remarks. Black's initial assessment had reinforced the view that continued storage of the chemical agent presents the greatest risk to the community. Bunch wrote, "I wish to express my thanks to R.Black," and, "The public will gain a better understanding of the risk assessment process and the need to destroy these weapons as soon as possible."
Beneath the diplomatic language lurked basic differences in approach and a lack of communication between the major players. Black, in a July 30 e-mail correspondence with the Hermiston Herald, said SAIC had not consulted with him, and that neither the new nor the old toxicity standards were reliable.
"I've not been contacted by anyone other than (the activists) Craig Williams and Karyn Jones, and that was some time ago," he wrote. "I've reviewed the EPA AEGL reports on VX and the G series nerve agents and find them surprisingly weak."
Following Black's initial review of the Phase 1 QRA, Black investigated further, and ended up with more concerns, this time regarding the Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) proposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The new guidelines are eventually expected to provide a common standard for organizations responding to chemical accidents. A technical review group, which includes Oregon and Washington officials, is now reviewing AEGL information.
SAIC's technical response puts off arguments about the AEGLs for later, on the one hand, and defends QRA Phase 1 on the other, citing alleged flaws in Black's study. "It is not possible to determine if Dr. Black's source data or analysis were completed with the same depth and rigor as that used in the UMCDF (Army documents)," the response states. SAIC further criticized some of Black's methods as "simplistic" and "without the degree of rigor" that the Army had used.
Seismic Events: Much of the SAIC report is technical, with terminology such as "ground motion attenuation relationships," and it includes complex mathematical formulas that are given to demonstrate that the Army was right, Black wrong, about seismic events. Other parts of the report seem clear enough for the lay reader: "What is critical is that the public understands that a severe earthquake, though very rare, could strike tomorrow."
Processing Risks risks not explicit in the report were assumed to be the same as those in Tooele, SAIC says. And for many "initiating events" there is no escape of agent to the environment. "Fault trees" are in the appendix. Agent type, release quantity, release duration, release type [spill, explosion, fire, etc.] and relevant consequence estimates for each sequence are include in the3 draft Phase 2 QRA.
Black was traveling at the time the SAIC report came out, but said he will look at the SAIC documents after he returns from his trip, which will be in September. An August 5 letter from Black to William Sanders, US EPA's Office Director, however, indicate Black's position at that time. He wrote, "The people living near the facility are concerned about the safety of the disposal process. ... Their concern is not misplaced."
While the Army's allowable toxicity levels, based on healthy male soldiers, were too high for the general public, Black says that the EPA's figures are biased in the other direction.
"I find the Public Draft reports provide very weak scientific support for the proposed AEGLs; the recommended thresholds are strongly, even unreasonably, biased toward low exposure levels. The result is that the exposure levels used in the Army's Phase 1 QRA are placed in question by equally questionable EPA results, leaving the public with no reliable way to assess their own safety."
And SAIC's analysis said, "Black takes the simplistic approach that any even involving a certain number of munitions results in an immediate and total release of the agent contents of those munitions."
Whether that is true, and regardless who is right, emergency managers say they are glad that, when in doubt, the EPA set lower exposure levels. In cases where there was uncertainty, the EPA simply built in a greater factor of safety, and that means more protection for the public, they say.
Morrow County Emergency Manager Casey Beard, however, told the Hermiston Herald earlier this month that he had yet to see a copy of Army's updated risk analysis, or QRA Phase 2, and that he needs that documentation in order to ensure the safety of the community. Beard said he can qualify for any level of security which the Army might require, but, "I need to see a copy of that information."
End
--------------------------
Appreciation: Article was preserved by iRazoo (http://www.irazoo.com/ViewSite.aspx?q=Hermiston+Herald&Page=1&irp=1&Site=http://www.cwwg.org/hh08.20.02b.html
Thank you iRazoo.
2002: Army, review of risk assessments
Hermiston Herald
Sept. 24, 2002
Review of risk assessments may be ready in December
By Frank Lockwood
Staff writer
HERMISTON - A review of the Army's new UMCDF Quantitative Risk Assessment is nearly completed: Panel members say they do not know if the Army will apply all of their recommendations.
The Army's new QRA, which is said to include more details on processing risks than former versions of the QRA, was in process for several years before it was submitted to the panel. The panel has held 12 meetings and 17 teleconferences since October 1999, and their report includes "in-depth review and comments" on the QRA methodology described in preliminary draft QRAs for UMCDF (Umatilla, July 2001) and ANCDF (Anniston, Ala., October 2000).
Speaking to the Citizens Advisory Commission on Thursday, concerning the new report, were Katheryn Higley, an associate professor at Oregon State University, and Shib Seth, a senior technical advisor with the Department of Engergy. Five other members of the panel, not present Thursday, included experts in probablistic risk assessment, process design, mathematical modeling, safety analysis and other fields related to risk assessment. The review was done in connection with Mitretek Systems, a not-for-profit organization that works "exclusively in the public interest."
As part of the study, the panel looked at review analyses performed by the contractor Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The panel made recommendations concerning QRA methodology, QRA maintenance and update, reduction of risks indentified by the QRA, and use of the QRA in risk management.
When questioned, panel representatives could not tell a local DEQ official what will happen if the Army disagrees with their recommendations. DEQ Administrator Wayne Thomas asked whether the Army was to be required to follow the recommendations, and what would be the process if the Army should happen to disagree with some of those recommendations. Seth and Higley acknowledged those were important questions but said they did not yet know the answers.
The UMCDF QRA is scheduled for completion in December 2002, but panel members and Army sources have said that the new QRA is expected to be a "living document' subject to change as changes are made to the design or operation of the plant.
Following the 911 terrorist attack, so-called "external events," including terrorist acts, have been given new attention.
Sept. 24, 2002
Review of risk assessments may be ready in December
By Frank Lockwood
Staff writer
HERMISTON - A review of the Army's new UMCDF Quantitative Risk Assessment is nearly completed: Panel members say they do not know if the Army will apply all of their recommendations.
The Army's new QRA, which is said to include more details on processing risks than former versions of the QRA, was in process for several years before it was submitted to the panel. The panel has held 12 meetings and 17 teleconferences since October 1999, and their report includes "in-depth review and comments" on the QRA methodology described in preliminary draft QRAs for UMCDF (Umatilla, July 2001) and ANCDF (Anniston, Ala., October 2000).
Speaking to the Citizens Advisory Commission on Thursday, concerning the new report, were Katheryn Higley, an associate professor at Oregon State University, and Shib Seth, a senior technical advisor with the Department of Engergy. Five other members of the panel, not present Thursday, included experts in probablistic risk assessment, process design, mathematical modeling, safety analysis and other fields related to risk assessment. The review was done in connection with Mitretek Systems, a not-for-profit organization that works "exclusively in the public interest."
As part of the study, the panel looked at review analyses performed by the contractor Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The panel made recommendations concerning QRA methodology, QRA maintenance and update, reduction of risks indentified by the QRA, and use of the QRA in risk management.
When questioned, panel representatives could not tell a local DEQ official what will happen if the Army disagrees with their recommendations. DEQ Administrator Wayne Thomas asked whether the Army was to be required to follow the recommendations, and what would be the process if the Army should happen to disagree with some of those recommendations. Seth and Higley acknowledged those were important questions but said they did not yet know the answers.
The UMCDF QRA is scheduled for completion in December 2002, but panel members and Army sources have said that the new QRA is expected to be a "living document' subject to change as changes are made to the design or operation of the plant.
Following the 911 terrorist attack, so-called "external events," including terrorist acts, have been given new attention.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)